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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT H. BETLEY, 
Platintiff arnd Respondent, 
-vs.-
LOUIS R. GALLEGOS, 




STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff, a former police officer, 
against defendant to recover damages for injuries aris-
ing out of an automobile-motorcycle accident which oc-
curred on Saturday, March 17, 1962, at about 5 :15 p.m. 
on 24th Street in Ogden, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Charles 
G. Cowley, Judge, sitting with a jury. The jury brought 
in a Yerdict for the plaintiff for the sum of $10,000.00. 
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Defendant filed and argued a motion for a judgment not 
withstanding the verdict and in the alternative for a new 
trial, both of which were denied hy the Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the judg-
ment of the lower Court and judgment in defendant's 
favor as a matter of law or in the alternative for a new 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The accident on which the plaintiff premises his 
cause of action occurred on Saturday, the 7th day of 
March, 1962, at approximately 5 :15 p.m. on 24th Street 
at a point approximately 180 feet east of the interscr-
tion of 24th Street and Washington Boulevard, in Og-
den, Utah. The plaintiff in the action was, at the time 
the accident occurred, a police officer for the Ogden City 
Police. He terminated his services, however, with the 
Police Department in July of 1964 (Tr. 65). l\Ir. Betley 
was 22 years of age at the time of the accident and had 
been with the Ogden Police Force for about a year prior 
thereto. 
The defendant, Louis Gallegos, resided at 815 1;>\r est 
26th Street, Ogden, Utah, at the time of the accident, 
and was a Mexican employed as a foreman for the Traek 
Gang of the Utah General Depot and was 58 years of 
age. 
Twenty-fourth Street, in Ogden, Utah, was 60 feet 
wide (Tr. 11). East of Washington Boulevard there 
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W(~re two westbound lanes of traffic which were divided 
hy a striped white line, and two eastbound lanes of 
traffic likewise divided by a striped white line, and a left-
turn lane which had a solid line to the north side of it 
and double yellow lines no longer clearly visible to the 
south side of it, which yellow lines were about six inches 
apart. (Defendant's Exhibit 1 (Tr. 44, 45, 133). The 
center of the highway was in the left turn lane and 
toward the north side of it (Tr. 22). The left-turn lane 
extended east of the point where the accident occurred 
to about the Eagle's Lodge as shown in defendant's Ex-
hibit 4 (Tr. 44, 45). There were also places for vehicles 
to park on the north and south side of 24th Street (Tr. 
44). Canal Alley took off from 24th Street to the north 
behind W. T. Grant Company at a point approximately 
180 to 190 feet east of Washington Boulevard (Tr. 45). 
Mr. Betley had traveled this area on numerous occasions 
and was familiar with traffic markings in the area 
(Tr. 44). 
Each of the witnesses who testified to the facts of 
the accident and the condition of the traffic lines de-
lineating the traffic lanes testified that the lanes were 
very faint and that particularly the lines identifying the 
double yellow line for the left-turn lane were either very 
fa int or non-existent. Officer ·Wilson (Tr. 15) said that 
double lines were visible but you had to look closely to 
see them. You could sit in the vehicle and see them if ~rnn 
were to the side of them, but they were faint, very faint. 
Officer Wilson in his patrol vehicle drove from the inside 
lane on the west side of Washington Boulevard into the 
left turn lane on the east side of Washington Boulevar<l 
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and discovered that he was in the wrong lane and moved 
to the right (Tr. 19). Traffic generally went further up 
the hill than he did before turning to the right. He state<l 1 
that it was not easy to discern the double line or any li11e 
at all (Tr. 19). 
Mr. Betley stated the markings on the higlm:1y 
were quite faint (Tr. 44), that the lines down close to 
Washington Boulevard did not show (Tr. 73), that the 
lines needed painting (Tr. 150), and that the photo-
graph (Exhibit D-1) was a fair representation of thl' 
appearance of the lines on the street (Tr. 73), but he 
also claimed that the lines did show in the photograph 
(Exhibit D-1) (Tr. 73). Officer Wilson also identiged the 
photograph D-1 and stated that it was a fair represen-
tation of the appearance of the street and lines as of the 
time of the accident (Tr. 16). 
Robert Morris, a professional photographer, took 
the photographs (Exhibits D-1 and D-4) on the 23rd of 
March, 1962, at 11 :00 a.m. which was six days after the 
accident occurred. The pictures were taken in the cen-
ter of the street (Tr. 108, 109). They were ta ken from a 
standing position at eye level (Tr. 123). He examined 
the street for lines and said there was no double line arnl 
said the picture was a fair representation of the appear-
ance of the lines that appeared on the highway. He fur-
ther stated that there was no double line near "\V ashing-
ton Boulevard. 
The defendant, Louis Gallegos, testified that he could 
not see the yellow lines on the pavement (Tr. 157, 161), 
and Danny Gallegos the son of the defendant who was 
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with the defendant at the time of the accident also testi-
fied that the lines generally were quite faded (Tr. 176), 
that he examined the street to see if there were any dou-
ble yellow lines, and there were none (Tr. 179, 181). 
The defendant, Louis Gallegos, was on his ·way to 
the Rainbow Gardens, a swimming pool in Ogden, Utah, 
to pick up his two daughters whom he had taken there in 
the forenoon over the same route (Tr. 153, 154). He was 
in the inside lane for eastbound traffic and had been sineP, 
entering on to 24th Street (Tr. 156, 157, 176, 182). He 
stopped on the west side of Washington Boulevard for 
the red semaphore signal, in the inside lane of traffic, and 
when it changed, proceeded forward directly east (Tr. 
156, 157). As the light turned green, the police officer 
came up along his right side (Tr. 176), and proceeded 
into the intersection where he shifted into second gear on 
the police motorcycle he was operating. 
M.r. Betley was traveling at about 20 miles per hour 
when he reached the east side of the intersection at Wash-
ington Boulevard (Tr. 7 4). He was in the inside lane, he 
imagined and probably close to the middle of the lane, but 
he didn't recall for sure (Tr. 75). At some time as he 
proceeded east on 24th Street he moved over toward the 
lines, and at the point when he was turning or started to 
make his turn, he was on the double yellow lines. When 
he started across 24th Street he intended to go east about 
100 feet including Washington Boulevard, make a "U" 
turn and return (Tr. 126) to join Officer Hunter, another 
motorcycle officer who was on duty on Washington Bou-
1eva rcl (Tr. 42). He did not recall whether there were 
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any vehicles proceeding east to the right of him up 24th 
Street east of Washington Boulevard (Tr. 125). He 
claimed he was signaling for a left turn as he crossed tfo, 
cross-walk on the east side of Washington Boulevard 
(Tr. 45). He had no mechanical signal for a turn and 
claimed that he was signaling with his arm (Tr. 46). JIP 
had previously told Officer Wilson who investigated the 
accident that he thought he gave a signal before shifting 
but couldn't swear to it (Tr. 26). When he reached a 
point approximately 100 feet east, he then observed a 
truck in Canal Alley on the north side of 24th Stred 
and decided that he would go up and investigate (Tr. 
143). At that time he shifted down and dropped ~ii;; 
arm and did not continue to give a further signal while 
he was traveling from 50 to 70 feet (Tr. 143). As lie 
started to make his left turn, the Gallegos vehicle would 
have been parallel to him, an Mr. Betley was just to 
the right of the double yellow line as he started his turn 
(Tr. 46, 49, 76, 127). 
Just as Mr. Betley started his turn, at the same ill-
stant as he turned, he caught a glimpse of the Gallegos 
vehicle (Tr. 140). He had not turned his head to look for 
any traffic that may have been coming behind him (Tr. 
141), although he admitted that this is what he usually 
did, and it was a good habit to get into (Tr. 140). The 
only time he looked through his rear-view mirror was 
just as he started to turn, and he said he got a glimpse 
of something in his rear-view mirror and his bike was 
thrown (Tr. 47, 140). 
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The impact occurred, according to Mr. Betley, ap-
proximately 5 to 6 inches or possibly a foot left of the 
double yellow line (Tr. 130). Officer Wilson put the im-
point of impact near the double line (Tr. 11). The initial 
point of impact on the vehicles was the end of the left han-
dle bar of the motorcycle and the right side of the Gal-
legos vehicle at a point near the antenna which was just 
forward of the windshield on the right front fender (Tr. 
8, 9, 23. Defendant's Exhibits 9, 6, 3 and 2). After the 
impact the bicycle fell south of the double yellow line and 
east of the point of impact. Officer Wilson measured 39 
feet south from the north curb to the handle bar of the 
motorcycle (Tr. 22 and 23). He also testified that the 
crnter of 24th Street above Washington Boulevard with 
respect to the traffic lanes was toward the north side of 
the left-turn lane (Tr. 22). The distance from the point 
of impact to the left handle bar of the motorcycle afti~r 
it fell to the highway was 17 feet east and south of the 
point of impact (Tr. 7). The defendant's vehicle was 
mrasured 108 feet from the point of impact in an easterly 
direction and slightly south from the point of impact. 
Mr. Gallegos, the defendant, observed the officer 
pull out ahead of him through Washington Boulevard 
as he, himself, proceeded directly in an easterly di-
rection from the lane within which he was stopped on 
the west side of Washington Boulevard. He followed 
the officer with the officer being just a few feet ahead of 
him, and the right side of the Gallegos vehicle approxi-
mately three to four feet from the motorcycle of the 
officer (Tr. 161, 162, 176, 177). He observed that the 
offi<'er was in uniform, and defendant was careful to see 
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that defendant did what was right ('l'r. 162). He kept 
his eye on the road ahead and glanced at the officer oc-
casionally (Tr. 163). He did not see the officer turn but 
felt the impact as soon as the officer's motorcycle struck 
his car (Tr. 163). His son, Danny, also said that he had 
been hit by the policeman (Tr. 167). Defendant looked to 
the rear and saw the policeman down on the highway and 
tried to stop but was confused and didn't know what to 
do after the impact but did bring his vehicle to a stop 
some distance east of the motorcycle and then hacked np 
a little bit (Tr. 164). He estimated his speed at 15 to 20 
miles per hour (Tr. 164). Officer Betley estimated Mr. 
Gallegos' speed at 15 to 25 miles per hour and stated that 
he was not traveling too fast (Tr. 139). 
Danny Gallegos who was riding in the right fr.:mt 
seat testified that his father's speed was about 20 mill'S 
per hour (Tr. 180). He also stated that the officer ·wa:-; 
about 3 feet ahead and 3 or 4 feet to the right of the right 
side of his father's vehicle (Tr. 180). He watched thP 
officer from the time he saw him pull through "\Vashi11g-
ton Boulevard until the time the impact occm-red aml 
testified that the officer did not at any time give a signal 
for a left turn (Tr. 177, 187). When the officer started 
to make his left turn, he tried to warn his father, hnt 
was unable to warn him before the impact occnrn•cl 
(Tr. 183). 
The plaintiff was not knocked from the hike by the 
impact with the car but did fall to the ground ,,·ith th<' 
left-hand side of the bike being on the ground ('rr. :>O). 
He was still straddling the bike, an<l it waR on top ot' 
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his left leg. The plaintiff crawled out from underneath 
the bike and tried to stand up, but he was unable to do so, 
and some officers from the Ogden City Police Department 
who appeared at the accident shortly after it occurred 
took him to the Dee Hospital where he remained for 
about four hours (Tr. 55, 56). He ·was experiencing pain 
in his left knee which had been operated on hef ore while 
he was a student in Montana. (Tr. 56). He returned to 
work after a week and drove an automobile for a while. 
When he went back to work, he had to keep his knee 
wrapped with Ace bandages, and it caused him some 
pain or discomfort when he walked (Tr. 57). After he 
went back to work, the swelling went down, and the knee 
felt fairly good after that, but it was some time before he 
took the Ace bandages off because it felt weak (Tr. 58). 
He also took about six or seven physical therapy treat-
ments from Dr. Krambule in Ogden over about that mauy 
weeks (Tr. 61, 62). In May of 1962 while riding his 
motorcycle in a training course for others he had an acci-
dent in which he injured his shoulder which had to br 
operated ou (Tr. 105). Both of l\Ir. Betley's knees had 
been operated on while he was a student in high school 
for removal of the cartilage in each one (Tr. 30-31). 
In February, 1964, Dr. Louis Peery, an orthopedist, 
in Ogden, Utah, performed an explorator>· operation on 
the knee but determined that there ·were no correcti,·e 
procedures required at that time ancl did not do aI\\-
eorrective surgery. Dr. Peery testified that the injm~· 
would not be limiting to l\Ir. Betle>- in the future as far 
as sports such as howling and golf are concerned, but 
that he would he better off if he didn't participate too 
much in active running sports (Tr. 90). He also ill(li-
cated that he might have some difficulty in the futur(• 
with the knee. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLI-
GENCE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT. 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW IN FAILING UNDER THE EXIST-
ING CIRCUMSTANCES TO GIVE A SIGNAL 
FOR A LEFT TURN OR TO LOOK TO THE 
REAR FOR TRAFFIC, AND THE COURT, 
THEREFORE, ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT AT THE CLOSE OF THE EVI-
DENCE. 
Counsel recognizes that ordinarily the qnestion of 
negligence, contributory negligence and proximate causr 
are proper questions for the jury to decide and that m1-
less it appears as a mathematical certainty that the acci-
dent in question would not have occurred had it not hecn 
for certain acts of negligence, such negligence would not 
as a matter of law be a proximate cause of the accident. 
The defendant strongly believes that the facts in this 
case showed clearly and conclusively that the plaintiff 
was negligent and that his negligence was, as a mattrr of 
law, a proximate cause of the collision, that the defend-
ant was not negligent a.nd, therefore, the <lefendant was 
entitled to a directed verdict. 
Five witnesses, including- the plaintiff, testifie(l ns 
to the condition of the traffic lines on 24th Street. All 
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of them testified that the lines were faint and that par-
icularly the double yellow lines were faint or non-exist-
ent. In addition thereto defendant's Exhibit 1 which ii" 
a photograph taken of the highway where the accident 
occurred six days after the accident occurred clearly 
shows that the double yellow line was not in existence 
nt the time this accident occurred, and it could not, 
therefore, be controlling on traffic at the time this acci-
dent occurred. Both the plaintiff and Capt. Wilson, of 
the Sheriff's Force in Weber County, who was the in-
Yestigating officer, testified that Exhibit D-1 was a fair 
representation of the appearance of the highway and the 
appearance of the lines as they existed at the time the 
accident occurred. The record reflects the following with 
respect to these various witnesses: 
Officer Wilson (Tr. 14) 
Q. What was the condition of the marking of the 
roadway at that time? 
A. This one lane was quite definite. This one line 
here (indicating on blackboard). The double 
line had faded. 
(Tr. 15) 
Q. Now actually, Capt. Wilson, were those lines 
visible at the time. 
A. Which ones? 
Q. Down in the lower area here, this double line. 
(Indicating on blackboard). 
A. They were visible, but you had to look closely 
to see them. 
Q. Well, when you say you have to look closely, 
how close did you have to be to the lines to 
see them? 
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A. Well, you could sit in a vehicle and look and 
see them if you was to the side of them or 
you could stand and look down and see them, 
but they were faint, very faint. 
Q. I show you what has been marked for identi-
fication as Defendant's Exhibit 1 and ask you 
to state whether or not you have seen that 
photograph before. 
A. Yes, sir, I have. 
Q. Will you state what it is. 
A. This is the picture of the scene where the acci-
dent took place. 
Q. Could you state whether or not the photograph 
appears to be a fair representation of the ap-
pearance of the street and the lines as of the 
time the accident occurred~ 
A. Yes, it is. 
Officer Wilson was asked to identify the double yel-
low lines on the photograph and he stated as follows: 
(Tr. 17, 18) ''The double yellow lines would be right 
here. On the picture you can see the traces of it going 
down here" (indicating on photograph). It is inter-
esting to note that Officer Wilson after the aecident had 
occurred approached the place of the accident from : itP 
west side of Washington Boulevard in the inside lane 
and proceeded across and found that he was in the let't-
turn traffic lane for westbound traffic. He testified that 
he was on the west side of the highway and he pointed 1 .. 
the inside lane and then was asked the following: 
(Tr. 19) 
Q. All right, now which way did you proceed 1 
A. I went straight east on 24th. 
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Q. In which lane did you go in? 
A. As I went across, I found myself right here 
in this lane [pointing to the left lane of traffic 
for westbound traffic] (ours in brackets) but 
knowing, I knew that this was wrong, and I 
immediately moved over to the right. 
Q. Now, did you you observe the traffic generally 
there? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And how did they proceed? 
A. Usually they went farther up the hill before 
they moved to the right. 
Q. Down at the point where they crossed was it 
easy to discern the double line or any line at 
all? 
A. No, it wasn't easy. 
The plaintiff, Officer Betley, traveled this highway 
frequently in performing his duties for the Ogden City 
Police Department. He testified as follows with respect 
to the markings on the highway: 
(Tr. 44) 
Q. Now, I will ask you if you will describe, as 
you recall, the condition of the markings on 
the highway. 
A. They were quite faint. 
(Tr. 73) 
Q. (Referring to Defendant's Exhibit 1.) All 
right, now would you say that's a fair repre-
sentation of the appearance of the lines at 
the time the accident occurred, the traffic lines? 
A. Y cs. The only thing in this one photograph 
here, if I may, the lines that you see here 
where the water is here, you can't see them, 
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but this is where the accident took place, and 
you can see the lines here if you look closely. 
Q. Down below close to W a.shington Boulevard 
the lines did not show, did they? 
A. Right. No, they don't. 
Q. But when you got up further, then the lines 
did show as shown in this photograph but 
were still very faint, is that correct 1 
A. Yes, right here. But you can't tell here be-
cause of the water on the street. 
Robert Morris, a professional photographer, re-
siding in Ogden, Utah, at the time the accident occurred 
took photographs (Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 4) of 
24th Street where the accident occurred six Jays after 
the accident had occurred. He testified that he took 
them from the center of the street, and he testified that 
he took them for the purpose of showing the lines up and 
down the center of the street. His testimony is as 
follows: 
(Tr. 109) 
Q. And did you examine the street itself for the 
lines? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now could you state whether or not those 
pictures are a fair representation of the ap-
pearance of the lines as of the time you took 
the pictures 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in your examination of the lines of the 
street did you observe whether or not there 
was any double line that showed near thr 
center of the street. 
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A. I don't believe there was anv double line that 
showed in the center. · 
Q. Did you see any? 
A. No. 
And again on cross-examination: 
(Tr. 111) 
A. I can remember at the time of taking the 
pictures at the location of the pictures that 
there was no double lines. 
The defendant, Louis Gallegos, testified that he could 
not see any lines as he proceeded up the street. 
(Tr. 161) 
Q. And you did look for the lines then, is that 
true? 
A. I did. 
Q. And you couldn't see them? 
A. I couldn't see them, no. 
Danny Gallegos, the son of the defendant, also testified 
that the lines were faded, that he examined the street ro 
see if there were any double yellow lines, and there were 
none. (Tr. 179) 
Q. (line 27) Did you examine the street to see 
if there were any double yellow lines? 
A. Yes, but there was no double line. 
(Tr. 181) 
Q. And when he, [speaking of Louis Gallegos], 
crossed the street, which lane did he enter in? 
Do you have an opinion as to that? When he 
got across the street, which lane was he in? 
A. I couldn't say for sure because I couldn't see 
the lines. He would have been anywhere with-
in the turning lane or in his own lane. 
15 
It is clear from the evidence of each of the witnesses 
who testified concerning the lines that the double yellm,-
line was not readily visible to an ordinarily observant 
person. Not one witness testified that it was readily oh-
servable. Section 41-6-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
Subsection b provides as follows: 
OBEDIENCE to - Effect of Improper Position, 
Illegibility or Absence of Sign. 
(b) No provision of this Act for which signs are 
required shall be enforced against an alleged 
violator if at the time and place of the alleged 
violation an official sign is not in proper posi-
tion and sufficiently legible to be seen by an 
ordinarily observant person. 
Section 41-6-63, U.C.A., 1953, authorizes the placr-
ment of marks on the highway where the volume of traffir 
or the vertical or horizontal curvature of the roadway 
renders it hazardous to drive along the highway on thP 
left of such marking or markings, and provides that: 
When such marking or markings are in place, 
the driver of a vehicle shall not drive along tlw 
highway to the left thereof. Under subsection 
l(a) the following markings shall he eonsiderPtl 
distinctive roadway markings: 
(a) A double longitudinal line, painted yel-
low, each line 4 inches wide and space(l 
4 inches apart. 
The court erroneously submitted this question to th 0 
jury when, in fact, all the evidence was that it was not 
legible enough to be seen by an ordinarily observant per-
son. Not one witness testified they were readily ohscn-
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able. This constituted error on the part of the court and 
misled the jury into its finding of negligence on the part 
of the defendant. 
The impact, according to those who testified per-
taining thereto, to-wit: Officer Wilson, who said it was 
on or near the yellow line and the plaintiff, Officer Betley, 
who said it was 6 inches or a foot to the north of the 
double yellow lines, would indicate that the defendant's 
,-ehicle at the time of the accident was on the south side 
of the center of the highway. Officer "'Wilson said that 
the eenter of the highway which he described as 60 feet 
wi(lc was toward the north side of the left-turn lane for 
westbound traffic. In Exhibit D-1 one can see by looking 
down at the traffic on the west side of Washington Bou-
levard the center of the highway and the general flow of 
traffic on the street. The west side of Vi ashington Boule-
vard and the east side of Washington Boulevard were 
both 60 feet wicle. The defendant's automobile was 
a hont 6 feet wide and almost all, if not all, of his vehicle 
was south of the center line of the road at the time 0f 
the impact. 
Tt is undisputed that the defendant proceeded di-
rectly rast from the point where he stopped on the west 
side of vVashington Boulevard which both he and his son 
say was in the inside lane of traffic. He followed tbe 
officer at a distance of a few feet with the motorcyclC' 
also being three or four feet to the right of the right 
si(lc of the defendant's vehicle. Both vehicles were trav-
Pling at a speed of about 15 to 20 miles per hour, tmd 
tlic> plaintiff readily admitted that the defendant was not 
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traveling too fast at the time the accicle11t occnrrNl nwl 
further that at the time the impact occurred the dcfell<l-
ant's vehicle was parallel with him and a few fe<>t to his 
left. The point of impact on the two v<>hirles was the l'lhl 
of the left handle bar on the plaintiff's motorcycle mul 
the right side of the defendant's vehicle at or near tlte 
antenna which was on the right front fender uear till' 
windshield. Defendant's Exhibits D-2, ~ and 6 show 1 h1• 
mark made by the handle bar covering on the side of thr 
car at the time the impact occurrerl. An examination of 
Defendant's Exhibit 5 in which the motorcycle is shown 
clearly shows the white handle har eo,·ering which "·as 
used on the motorcyele. 
Officer Betley testified that as he approaehed \Vash-
ington Boulevard from the west, tlw light turned grer11 
for him just about the time he arrived at the intersrr-
tion and he, therefore, did not stop but proceeded in1 o 
the intersection and shifted into second gear. He wn,.; 
traveling at a speed of approximately 20 miles per h(Jm 
as he arrived on the east side of Washington Boulevard. 
He further testified that he gave a signal with his left 
hand for a turn at that point because he intended to pro-
ceed about 100 feet up 24th Street counting the width of 
Washington Boulevard and then make a U-tnrn and comr 
down and join Officer Hunter who was then stopped on 
Washington Boulevard. (Officer Hunter took the pietnres 
Plaintiff's Exhibits B & C and Defendant's 5, 6 & 9.) Bet-
ley did not remember any other vehicles being stopped wc>st 
of Washington Boulevard nor did he rememher any traf-
fic proceeding in the right-hand lane either with him or 
ahead of him in the right-hand lane as he proceedc>d 
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across Washington Boulevard and up 24th Street. He 
testified that he was in the inside lane and probably about 
in the middle thereof, although he did not recall. He was 
giYing a signal, he claimed, with his left hand because 
his machine did not have electrical signal equipment on 
it for turns. Officer Wilson, the investigating officer, 
testified that when he talked to Mr. Betley after the acci-
dent, Betley told him that he thought he gave a sign.al 
before shifting but couldn't swear to it. 
When he reached a point approximately 100 feet 
rast, he then observed a truck in Canal Alley on the 
north side of 24th Street and decided that he would go up 
and investigate. At that time he shifted down, dropped 
his arm and did not continue to give a further signal 
while he was traveling the 50 to 70 feet to where he 
started his turn. As he testified: 
(Tr. 143) 
Q. And when you got 100 feet up, was it then that 
you decided to go up and check on the truck T 
A. Yes, I just proceeded up the street then. I 
didn't start to turn or anything else. I was 
signaling for a turn and then just proceeded 
whatever the distance was further up the 
street, probably 60 or 70 feet. 
Q. I see. Now then when you decided to go fur-
ther ahead, did you then discontinue your sig-
naling? 
A. l don't recall, but there was probably about 
three seconds there that I traveled 50 or 60 
or 70 feet that I might have dropped my arm 
to shift down to make the turn. 
Q. I see. So you may not have been giving the 
signal during that period. 
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A. Well, prior to the period I was giving the sig-
nal, but-
Q. Just answer my questions, Mr. Betley, and 
we '11 get through a lot faster. During that pe-
riod I say you probably were not giving the 
signal. 
A. Not when I was shifting down. No, I couldn't 
be. 
Q. And you were shifting down during that about 
70 or 80 feet or whatever it was. Is that cor-
rect? 
A. From 50, 60 or 70 feet, yes. 
Mr. Betley, therefore, failed completely to compl~­
with the law with respect to a signal for a left turn. Utah 
Statute Section 41-6-69, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
(a) "No person shall turn a vehicle ... to enter 
a private road or driveway or otherwise turn ave-
hicle from a direct course or move right or left 
upon a roadway unless and until surh mm·ement 
can be made with reasonable safety. No pers'111 
shaJl turn any vehicle without giving an appro-
priate signal in the manner hrreinafter provided 
in the event any other traffir may be affected hy 
such movement. 
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left 
shall he given continuously during not 10ss than 
the last ioo feet travelerl hy the vehrle hefore 
turning. 
The evid0nre is clear hy the plaintiff's 0"\'11 testimony 
that he did not give a signal during the last GO to 70 frrt 
prior to his making a turn and if Daniel Gallrgos, wl10 
was watching him like a ha-..Yk ·watches a mouse hecnnse 
he was an officer and becausr he aml 11is fatli0r "·0r1• 
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traveling just to the left of Betley and a few feet behind 
him, is believed, he didn't give a signal at any time after 
leaving Washington Boulevard. If he had been giving 
a signal for a distance of 100 feet east of Washington 
Boulevard, and then discontinued giving the signal and 
proceeded forward, a person following along behind him 
would have a right to assume that he had given up his 
intention of making a turn and that he thereafter in-
tended to proceed straight forward. His failure to give 
a signal during the last 100 feet as provided by statute 
was a violation of the statute, negligence and a proximate 
<'ause of the accident. 
He certainly didn't know whether or not there was 
any traffic which would be affected by his failure to 
give a signal because he did not at any time look to see 
whether or not there was any traffic behind him or to 
the left of him. This in spite of the fact that he was well 
acquainted with the condition of the highway where the 
accident took place and the absence of the lines deline-
ating the left-turn lane. ·w"ith respect to lookout he 
testified as follows: 
(Tr. 140) 
Q. Now you didn't observe the vehicle back at 
Washington Boulevard, did you~ 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. And as you approached the place where the 
accident occurred, did you look to the rear to 
see if any cars were coming? 
A. Not turning my head. No. 
Q. ·well, did you look through your rear-view 
mirror. 
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A. I did catch a glimpse of a vehicle coming 
through my rear-view mirror. 
Q. Well, that was after vou started vour turn 
though, wasn't it? · · ' 
A. Yes. Yes, it was right at the same instant as 
my turn. 
(Tr. 141) 
Q. Does your motorcycle have a rear-view mirror 
on it, did I understand you to say? 
A. It had two of them, right. 
Q. And is this prior to turning - what you did 
is look in your rear-view mirror? 
A. Well, I don't know whether I looked or just 
caught the glance of something behind me. 
Now, usually you naturall)' look as yon <'omr 
up the street to make sure that there's nothing 
behind )'Ou. 
Q. And isn't that what you usually do? 
A. Yes. It is a good habit to get into, yes. 
Q. And you didn't do it on this occasion; did you! 
A. No, I didn't. Not that I can recall. 
Q. Well, that's the first time that you ever saw 
the vehicle; isn't it, as you started your turn? 
A. Saw a vehicle, or the vehicle? 
Q. Saw the vehicle, the Gallegos vehicle. 
A. Yes. 
It is clear from the plaintiff's own testimony that 
he did not look either by glancing through his rear-view 
mirror in time for him to do any good if he did look into 
it, and he did not turn his head and look. He is charged 
with the knowledge which he had at the time that thl' 
lines were definitely faint and not visible in most place~. 
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He had been over the area many times before, and he, 
therefore, had a clear duty to look. By his own testi-
mony he failed to give a signal during the last 50 to 70 
feet, and he also failed to look to see whether a car was 
coming. The defendant's vehicle was right alongside 
him at the time he turned. The only impact was between 
the handle bar and the right side of the defendant's 
vehicle. There was no speed on the part of the de-
fendant's vehicle, and if the plaintiff had looked at all, 
he would have seen that the car was there, and he could 
either have slowed more than he did until the car went 
by or accelerated so that he could make his turn when 
he would not be hindered by the vehicle of the defendant. 
In the case of Hayden v. Cederlund, 1 Ut. 2d 171, 263 
P.2d 796, our court said: 
·we have held that the Statute requires a 
driver who is about to make a left turn to give 
way to oncoming traffic, and one executing such 
a turn is C'hargeable with negligence upon failure 
properly to judge speed or distance. The driver 
here was in his proper lane, but was charged not 
with failure to heed oncoming traffic, but in fail-
ing to observe traffic behind. Aside from statute, 
whether one is negligent in failing to observe 
traffic approaC'hing from the rear, after giving 
a proper signal in the proper lane of traffiC', 
would be a jury question based on the particular 
facts of eaC'h C'ase, unless reasonable minds could 
not di ff er as to the fact of negligence or non-
negligence - whence a matter of law would arise. 
One certainly would be negligent in law if, 
without reason, he deliberately turned into the 
path of a speeding fire engine knowing it was 
attempting to pass, but hardly could he be charged 
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with negligence in turning at an intersection 
without looking back or even signaling if he \\'er0 
in the middle of a funeral procession with no 
warning of impending danger from the rear. Be-
tween the two extremes where negligence or non-
negligence is determinable as a matter of law is a 
wide territory ordinarily surveyed by the jury. 
The defendant was not purposely trying to pass 
the plaintiff. He was just following along to the left of 
the plaintiff keeping his eyes ahead of him on the road 
and occasionally glancing at the plaintiff. At the tim0 
the impact occurred the defendant's gaze was naturally 
some distance ahead because at that time the two vehi-
cles were parallel with each other and about even. There 
was no evidence of any negligence on defondant 's part. 
In the case of Harper, et al., Appellants, v. Man_qPI, 
Appellee, Florida Dist. Ct. of Appeal, March 26, 1963, 
28 Automobile Cases 2d 780, 15 So. (2) 346 the defendant 
was driving her automobile at 20 to 26 miles per hour 
on a clear, dry day and attempting to pass the plaintiff 
on the left. When approximately ten yards from the 
bicycle of the plaintiff, the plaintiff suddenly and with-
out warning cut directly into the defendant's path. T110 
defendant in that action took the only instinctivel~· 
evasive action by cutting her steering wheel to the left 
and applying her brakes. The court held that there 
were no facts upon which any negligence of the defendant 
could be predicated. The plaintiff was, as a matter of 
law, guilty of negligence proximately causing the acci-
dent, and the decision of the trial court in granting <1 
summary judgment was upheld. In this case tlw plai11-
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tiff cyclist was riding about one to one and one-half yards 
uorth of the south curb prior to the time the accident 
occurred. His deposition showed that prior to the time 
the accident occurred and prior to the time that he 
turned his bicycle to the left, he was aware of vehicular 
traffic behind him going in the same direction that he 
was going. He stated, however, that just before he turned 
to his left he did not know where this vehicular traffic 
was. The plaintiff further stated that he never saw the 
defendant's automobile until he heard the squeal of her 
tires, although he stated that just before he began his 
left turn he turned his body and looked behind him for 
traffic. 
The re,-iewing court stated: 
It appears from this record on appeal that 
the final summary judgment rendered by the trial 
court was correct in all particulars, and in par-
ticular that portion wherein he found that the 
sole proximate cause of the accident was the 
plaintiff's own negligence; that the defendant 
was not guilty of any negligence and was not 
possessed of any opportunity to reasonably pre-
vent the accident after the plaintiff himself had 
commenced a course of conduct which resulted in 
the injury. 
Mr. Betley contended in his testimony that he had 
no duty to look to the rear, that he could assume that 
there wouldn't be a car passing him on the left in the 
left-turn lane for westbound traffic. Of course, the left-
tnrn lane was not readily observable at the time this 
accident occurred. The courts have held, in any event, 
that one is not absolved of this duty of maintaining a 
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proper lookout and g1vmg a signal at a place on the 
highway where a vehicle could not overtake and pass 
without violating the law. Thus in the case of Bellon, 
Apellant v. Heinzig, et al., Respondent, United States 
Ct. of Appeals for the 9th Cir., June 4, 1965, District 
Court of Mont., 347 F. (2d) 4, 33 Automobile Cases 2<l, 
1335, the trial judge found both parties guilty of negli-
gence. The defendants' negligence consisted of attempt-
ing to pass plaintiff's truck in a clearly marked "no 
passing zone" and plaintiff was negligent in failing to 
look to the rear to determine whether he could safely 
make a turn. Heinzig attempted to pass in an area where 
there was a clearly marked solid yellow line. 
The plaintiff contended that he had a duty to main-
tain a lookout to the front and sincee he had a right to 
assume that the defendant would abide by Section 32-2157 
of the Montana Code which prohibited passing in a no 
passing zone, the court erred in holding that the plaintiff 
was negligent in not looking to the rear before tnrnin~ 
left. Section 32-2167 of the Revised Codes of Montana, 
1947, provided: 
No person shall turn a vehicle to enter a 
private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a 
vehicle from a direct course or move right or left 
upon a roadway unless and until such movement 
can be made with reasonable safety ... 
The District Court of Montana interpreted this Section 
which is the same as our 41-6-69, U.C.A., 1953, as im-
posing an affirmative duty upon the plaintiff to main-
tain a proper lookout to the rear as well as forwar<l 
before making a left turn. The court stated: 
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Other courts have construed similar statutes 
in the same way. (Citing) Werner Transportation 
v. Zimmennan, 201 Fed. 2d 687, 692 [7th Cir., 
1953]. Woodmen v. Knight, 380 P.2d 222, (Idaho, 
1963); Voyt v. Nyberg, 345 P.2d 821, 825 (Ore., 
1959): Scott v. Gilbertson, 85 N. W. 2d 852, 855, 
(Wis., 1957); Alex v . .Jozelich, 78 N. W. 2d 440, 
445, (Minn., 1956) ( 1). This is the general eom-
mon law rule, Krause v. United States, 137 Fed. 
Supp. 47, 49-50 (D. Delaware, 1955); Myers v. 
Siercy, 356 S. W. 2d 59, 62-63 (Miss., 1962) (2). 
Bellon was not absolved from his duty to 
maintain a proper lookout to the rear by the fact 
that he was making a left turn at a place on the 
highway 'vhere no vehicle could overtake and pass 
him without violating the law. The Supreme 
Court of Montana has recognized the general rule 
that a driver is entitled to assume that other 
drivers will proceed in a lawful manner. (Cowden 
v. Crippen, 53 P.2d 98, 104 (Mont., 1936), but it 
has also noted that the rule is subject to the 
qualification that one is never excused from ex-
ercising ordinary care and may not assume that 
another will obey the law when in the exercise of 
ordinary care it would be apparent that the other 
would not. Jessen v. O'Daniel, 349 P.2d 107, 113 
(Mont., 1960). 
The court further stated that the section of the Code 
32-2167 (our Section 41-6-69) which imposes the duty 
upon the turning driver to determine that the turn can 
be safely made makes no exception for the case of the 
lawless passer. 
Mr. Betley contended that he had a right to assume 
that vehicles would not be coming up the left-turn lane 
for westbound traffic, and he, therefore, had no duty to 
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signal or keep a lookout. The court's instruction which 
was taken from J.I.F.U. No. 1 6.12 provided that: 
A person who is observing due care for his 
own safety has a right to assume that another 
is possessed of normal faculties of sight and hear-
ing and that said person will use them in exer-
cising ordinary care for his own safety and the 
safety of others, and he has the right to rely on 
that assumption unless, in the exercise of due 
care, he observes or should observe something 
to warn him to the contrary. 
Mr. Betley, however, was not observing due care for 
his own safety under the instructions of the court hl•-
cause he had not given a signal as required by law, and 
he had not kept any lookout whatever to the rear aR 
required by the court's instruction. This instruction, 
therefore, does not help him, and he had no right to make 
any assumptions. 
He was negligent as a matter of law in failing to 
comply with the two instructions delineating his duties 
to the jury. The question then becomes whether or not as 
a matter of law his failure in either one of these grounds 
of negligence was a proximate cause of the accident as 
a matter of law. 
If on all the evidence reasonable men could come 
to but one conclusion, there is no question of fact for 
decision and under such circumstances the question of 
proximate cause will be one of law. 
Ark.: Duckworth v. Stephens, 30 S.\:V. (2) 840. 
Ky.: Saddler v. Parham, 249 S.W. (2) 945. 
N. J.: Saracco v. Lyttle, 78 A. (2) 288. 
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Ut.: Balle v. Smith, 17 P. (2) 224, 81 Ut. 179. 
The undisputed evidence is that the vehicle of the 
defendant was traveling at a reasonable speed parallel 
to the motorcycle of the plaintiff and in immediate 
proximity thereto. If he had looked whatever, he would 
have seen the vehicle and not have turned. The fact that 
he struck the vehicle in the side with his handle bar is 
clear proof that his negligence was a proximate cause 
of the accident. If he had not turned, there would not 
have been an accident. If he had looked, he would not 
have turned. His failure, therefore, in regard to looking 
was a proximate cause of the accident. 
With respect to his failure to give a signal, Danny 
Gallegos was watching him at all times, and if he had 
been giving a signal just prior to his turn, Danny could 
have and would have warned his father. Danny did try 
to warn his father when the turn was made but didn't 
have time before the impact. The failure to give a signal, 
therefore, was also a proximate cause of the accident 
although this may not appear quite as clearly as the 
failure to keep a proper lookout. Counsel submits with 
respect to Point 1 that the trial court was in error in fail-
ing to grant defendant's request for a directed verdict, also 
its request for a judgment not withstanding the verdict. 
POINT II 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY, FAILED TO GIVE DEFEND-
ANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS AND 
SHOULD HA VE GRANTED DEFENDANT A 
NR\V TRIAL. 
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The defendant requested the court to give its re-
quested Instruction No. 6 (R-12) which provided as fol-
lows: 
The law requires that 110 person shall turn a 
vehicle upon a public highway unless and until 
such movement can be made with reasonable 
safety. This does not mean, however, that the 
driver of a motor vehicle before making a turn 
must know that there is no possibility of accident. 
It means that before starting to turn a vehicle 
and while making the turn, the driver of the 
vehicle must use such precaution as would satisfy 
a reasonably prudent person acting under similar 
circumstances, that the turn could be made safely. 
This request was made in accordance with Instruction 
21.20 of J.I.F.U. and the provisions of 41-6-69, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. This instruction was proper under the 
facts in evidence in this case. It was not completely cov-
ered by any other instruction given by the court nor by 
all of the instructions given by the court. In the case of 
Glover v. Jolvn G. Lane Lines, Inc., (Florida, 1963), 28 
Automobile Cases 2d at page 78, the car in which plain-
tiff was a passenger attempted to pass defendant's truck 
200 feet from an intersection. Defendant pulled out, 
causing an accident injuring plaintiff. The court gaw 
defendant's request for an instruction concerning a lmr 
which prohibited passing within 100 feet of an inter-
section but refused to grant plaintiff's request for an 
instruction which provided that: 
No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct 
course upon a highway unless and until such 
movement can he made with reasonable safety, 
and then only after giving an appropriate signal 
in the manner hereinafter prov1d0d, in the event 
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any other vehicle may be affected by such move-
ment. 
The Supreme Court held that it was error for the trial 
court not to give this requested instruction under the 
facts. 
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 3 was a some-
what similar instruction which the court also refused to 
give which provided that the parties had a duty to drive 
as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and 
not to move from one lane to another until the driver 
had first ascertained that he could do so with reasonable 
safety. This instruction was also applicable under the 
circumstances and one or the other of the two instruc-
tions should have been given, if not both. The court's 
failure to give these two instructions was prejudicial to 
the defendant. The duties under these instructions are 
both provided by the Utah Code. Defendant took excep-
tion to the court's failure to give these instructions 
('rr. 191), and the court's failure to give defendant's 
requested Instruction No. 11 which requested the court 
to instruct the jury as a matter of law that the double 
yellow line previously existing on 24th Street was so 
illegible that it could not readily have been seen by an 
ordinarily observant person, and that it was, therefore, 
ineffective and could not be enforced against the opera-
tors of motor vehicles involved in the accident. 
The evidence concerning the matter covered under 
the defendant's requested Instruction No. 11 has been 
discussed in this brief under Point I and was such that 
reasonable men could not differ on the conclusion that 
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the double yellow line was not present or readily ob-
servable and the court should, therefore, have ruled on 
this as a matter of law and given our requested Instru<'-
tion No. 11. 
The defendant also took exception to the court's 
Instruction No. 10 in which the court instructed the jury 
that the defendant was driving in the wrong lane at the 
time and place in question. The evidence introduced in 
the case clearly showed that the defendant actually was 
traveling on the south side of the center of the highway 
when the accident occurred and without the double lines 
being present the lane would he merely another lane 
which would be available for traveling or passing. 
Section 41-6-63, U.C.A., 1953, authorizes the place-
ment of marks on the highway where the volume of traf-
fic or the vertical or horizontal curvature of the road-
way renders it hazardous to drive along the highway 011 
the left of such marking or markings, and provides that 
when such marking or markings are in place, the driver 
of a vehicle shall not drive along the highway to the left 
thereof. Under subsection la the following markings 
shall be considered distinctive roadway markings: 
(a) A double longitudinal line, painted yellow, 
each line four inches wide, and spaced four inches 
apart. 
Such lines were not present at the time this accident 
occurred east of Washington Boulevard on 24th Stn'et. 
If the plaintiff had a right to drive to the left of thr 
place where the lines formerly were, so di cl the def ernhrnt. 
Courts have held that the yellow lines are desig-md 
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primarily to prevent collision between an overtaking 
and passing automobile and a vehicle coming from the 
opposite direction and to protect occupants of other cars, 
pedestrians and property on the highway, and not to 
prohibit passing otherwise cars proceeding in the same 
diredion. See Powell v. Clark, 255 No. Car. 707, 710, 
122 S.E. 2d 706, Rushin.g v. Polk, No. Car. (Nov., 1962), 
27 Automobile Cases 2d 885. 
The court did not give either counsel a chance to 
discuss the instructions with the court prior to the 
court's instructing the jury, nor did the court inform 
counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to 
instructing the jury. Counsel were furnished a copy of 
instructions just at the time the court read the instruc-
tions to the jurors. After the jury retired the conr asked 
counsel at that time if they wanted to take exception to 
the court's instructions which was done (Tr. 190). Coun-
sel, therefore, did not have an opportunity to determine 
which instructions the court had given or refused except 
as the court read the instructions to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff failed to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that any negligence on the part of the 
defendant Gallegos proximately caused the accident. 
Furthermore, the evidence conclusively and as a matter 
of law showed that the plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. On either or both of these grounds the 
court should have granted defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict or subsequently a judgment not with-
standing the verdict and in the alternative defendant's 
subsequent motion for a new trial. 
The court's instructions were likewise in error, and 
it is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
lower court should be reversed with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of the defendant or in the alternative 
that a new trial be granted. 
Respeetfully submitted, 
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